However, the general provisions on transparency provide for a rapid response to trade problems and/or customs procedures and can contribute to the general intensification of bilateral trade between FTA partners. PPZ provides estimates for a number of countries, including Canada and Korea (Table 5). According to PPZ, we model the NTB reduction in commodities as a positive shock to productivity. To measure the asymmetric effect of NTB reductions, we consider NTB-related trade costs to be the most accessible in Singapore. We reduce bilateral trade costs between Canada and Korea by 10% of the difference between the declared ad valorem duty equivalent of NTBs in each country and the declared level for Singapore. Korea`s transparency index will be removed on the basis of improved bilateral consultation mechanisms. Bilateral trade in services between Canada and Korea increased, with Korea recording the strongest growth and tripling its exports to Canada in U.S. dollars between 2005 and 2011. The global crisis fell sharply in 2009, but bilateral exports from both countries fully recovered the following year. Neither country is particularly high in the other`s global market considerations; However, Canada is Korea`s 13th largest services export market (the EU is considered a market), while Korea is Canada`s 11th largest market on the same basis. Second, for trade in industrial goods using preferences, we assume that the costs of preferential use are ad valorem, based on a review of the relevant literature (see, for example.

B Ciuriak and Xiao, 2014b). These costs are taken into account as a negative productivity shock of 1.26% (or 0.63 times 2%). The agreement covers investments in both services and other economic activities, including the EU-South Korea trade agreement protecting European Geographical Indications (GIs) for the agreement The agreement also allows for bilateral cumulation. Materials originating in South Korea may be considered as originating in the EU when used in the manufacture of a product in the European Union and vice versa. Finally, it seems that a word of caution is needed regarding the relative effectiveness of formal intergovernmental agreements in relation to trade relations. Korea and Canada have very different business cultures. In particular, social capital remains important in the Korean economy with its Chaebol system (Witt, 2013). The top ten Korean chaebol account for 80% of Korea`s GDP, with the Samsung Group alone accounting for 28% (Murillo and Sung, 2013). Whether or not formal contracts and transparency obligations can penetrate these networks of corporate and personal relationships is an outstanding question (Lee, 2013).

For Korea and Canada to reap the benefits that CKFTA promises on paper, relations must be nurtured and the trade openness promised on paper must be translated into the economy into reality. . . .